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A B S T R A C T
Strategic alliances between competitors (coopetition) is perceived to be full of tensions that needs to be man-
aged. This study explore the evolution of a Norwegian coopetition alliance, through how firms handle tensions
over time. The study finds that the firms experience a mutual dependence towards one another and that this
dependence evolves over time. In the early phases of a coopetition alliance firms handle tension by relying on a
structural dependence with their partners whereas firms move towards a more harmonious relationship with
their partners by building a psychological dependence through trust and generosity. Further, the results indicate
these dependencies might reduce the possible tensions related to asymmetries in size and knowledge between
firms.
1. Introduction
In today's rapid changing world, manufacturing firms face in-
creasing expectations to produce better, faster, cheaper and with less
pollution than ever before. To enhance products or production pro-
cesses, firms are often dependent on research and development (R&D),
which can impose challenges through increasing technological devel-
opment, shorter product life cycles and increasing costs (Sampson,
2007). To face these challenges, firms are to an increasingly extent
engaged in R&D cooperation with external partners (Becker & Dietz,
2004; Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002). Strategic alliances, joint ventures,
university-industry cooperation are some examples of cooperative re-
lations where organizations can conduct joint R&D (Bruneel, d'Este, &
Salter, 2010; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996; Parkhe, 1993). Al-
though such interorganizational cooperation has received a lot of at-
tention in the literature (Schermerhorn Jr, 1975; Smith, Carroll, &
Ashford, 1995), a form of interorganizational cooperation that has re-
ceived less attention is coopetition, where competing firms that pursue
similar (or partly similar) geographical and product markets, cooperate
(Kraus, Meier, Niemand, Bouncken, & Ritala, 2018; Ritala &
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). Although coopetition research is still in
its infancy (Gast, Filser, Gundolf, & Kraus, 2015), it is growing rapidly
with several contributions related to the motives, likelihood, interac-
tion, process and outcome of coopetition (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014). As
coopetition is regarded as a paradox where two firms interact with
contradictory logics related to cooperation and competition, tension is
viewed as the consequence of this interaction (Raza-Ullah, Bengtsson, &
Kock, 2014). It is concluded that coopetition is filled with tension
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2014), and this tension can be discussed in relation
to role conflicts, tension between cooperation and competition, or be-
tween the contradictions inherent in the nature of the coopetitive
phenomenon, such as value creation versus value appropriation (Raza-
Ullah et al., 2014).
This paper will focus on the possible tensions related to competing
firms cooperating on joint R&D. In this situation, tensions can arise
when firms are expected to share information with their competitors in
order to do joint research. Knowledge sharing can provide the firm with
new valuable knowledge from the coopetition partner, but there is also
the risk that the firm can lose valuable firm-specific knowledge to a
competitor (Das & Teng, 1999). Further, in the value appropriation
process the firms compete over the knowledge created in the alliance,
which can be the process filled with most tension as all partners want
their piece of the pie. One approach to the tension view of coopetition is
to study how firms handle these tensions. One strategy is to rely on
formal contracts (Enberg, 2012) or a well-developed appropriability
regime to protect firm-specific knowledge (Bouncken, Gast, Kraus, &
Bogers, 2015; Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2013). Another strategy
is, whenever possible, to try cooperation to manage tensions, as trust
and commitment developed through collaboration can reduce tension
(Tidström, 2014) and be beneficial for innovation (Park, Srivastava, &
Gnyawali, 2014a). Although the literature has uncovered several
sources of tension and strategies to handle them, there is little
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knowledge on coopetitive processes (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014), parti-
cularly the process of how firms manage tensions (Raza-Ullah et al.,
2014). Further, there is a significant gap in our knowledge on how and
why coopetition persists in maturing market categories (Mathias,
Huyghe, Frid, & Galloway, 2018).
This paper aims to narrow these gaps by exploring how firms
manage the possible tension related power and dependence in a coo-
petition alliance. A theoretical perspective suitable to investigate these
aspects, is the resource dependence theory. This perspective is chosen
because it provides a framework for analyzing the evolution of a coo-
petition alliance from why organizations form interorganizational ar-
rangements, the evolution of the relationship and why firms seek long-
term relationships. The resource dependence theory explain these parts
through power asymmetries and mutual dependence as constructs im-
portant for understanding resource dependence between firms
(Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Hillman, Withers, &
Collins, 2009). First, the concept of mutual dependence can explain the
development of trust between cooperative partners (Gulati & Sytch,
2007), whereas power asymmetries is seen as the potential for one
partner to impose one's will on another regardless of their interests
(Czakon, 2009). This paper focus on how the mutual dependence be-
tween competitive firms develops over time and its effect on tensions in
R&D coopetition. Second, the paper focus on asymmetries between
firms related to size and knowledge, as there is a gap related to studying
asymmetric alliances, especially the development of trust mechanisms
between asymmetric firms (H. Yang, Zheng, & Zhao, 2014). The fol-
lowing research question is explored: “How do firms handle the possible
tensions related to power and dependence in R&D coopetition?”
The paper addresses this question by employing longitudinal case
studies of firms in a Norwegian coopetition alliance. This alliance
consists of firms within the process industry of different sizes and dif-
ferent levels of resources and knowledge. By adding to the few studies
on the evolution of coopetition relationships (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014),
the limited knowledge on the capabilities that are necessary to coopete
successfully (Bouncken et al., 2015), and the call for more research on
how coopetition persists over time in a mature industry (Mathias et al.,
2018), this paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, the
paper contributes longitudinal insight into the evolution of a coopeti-
tion alliance through the evolution of mutual dependence between
firms. Second, this paper contributes to the limited insight into how
firms handle the possible tensions arising from cooperating with com-
petitors (Raza-Ullah et al., 2014; Tidström, 2014), by showing that
building structural and psychological dependencies reduces the pos-
sible tensions related to asymmetries in size and knowledge between
firms, making the relationship more stable and robust. Third, this study
provides data from an alliance with several competing partners. As
most studies on coopetition focus on dyadic relationships (Park et al.,
2014a), this study provide novel insight into how firms are able to
handle the cooperation with several competitors.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, the theoretical perspective is
presented, building on the literature on strategic alliances, resource
dependence theory, coopetition and value creation and value appro-
priation. Next, the methodology is discussed and the case is presented.
Following this, the empirical findings are presented in conjunction with
the discussion of the scholarly literature, followed by three derived
propositions. Finally, the conclusions are presented.
2. Literature review
A strategic alliance between firms is a mechanism to share skills and
resources to reach some common goals for the involved firms (Cimon,
2004). Mowery et al. (1996) classifies different forms of alliances on a
scale from simple unilateral contracts, through more complex con-
tractual alliances, such as technology sharing and joint development
agreements, collaborative R&D, to equity joint ventures where the
partner firms share ownership in a separately incorporated entity.
Alliances on joint R&D, where innovative activity or an exchange of
technology is part of the alliance agreement (Gilsing, Lemmens, &
Duysters, 2007; Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; Verspagen & Duysters,
2004), are important for many firms as it facilitates transfer of re-
sources, exchange of knowledge and competencies, as well as the
sharing of the risks involved in R&D projects and innovation (Cassiman,
Di Guardo, & Valentini, 2009). Alliances between competing firms,
coopetition, comes in many forms, although the more recent stream of
literature on coopetition has focused more and more on collaborative R
&D and joint innovation processes (Bouncken & Kraus, 2013; Enberg,
2012; Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Park et al., 2014a). Coopetition related
to R&D and innovation means that firms collaborate in R&D-activities,
whereas they compete in utilizing the knowledge derived from the
collective R&D in their own firms' product or process development
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2000). There is also a shift from early studies on
coopetition that mainly focused on the dyadic relationship between two
actors towards a more multifaceted view on coopetition, incorporating
multiple partner alliances, as well as coopetition in horizontal and
vertical relationships. This study will therefore consider coopetition in
relation to Bengtsson and Kock's (2014, p. 182) definition that “coo-
petition is a paradoxical relationship between two or more actors simulta-
neously involved in cooperative and competitive interactions, regardless of
whether their relationship is horizontal or vertical”.
2.1. Coopetition, paradox and tension
A paradox is defined as the simultaneously existence of two incon-
sistent states, such as new and old, innovation and efficiency
(Eisenhardt, 2000), or in relation to coopetition, the two contradictory,
yet interrelated, elements of competition and cooperation that are
juxtaposed in one phenomenon (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014; Raza-Ullah
et al., 2014). This paradox is considered to be an antecedent of tension
(Raza-Ullah et al., 2014), which is much discussed in the strategic al-
liance literature (Autio, 2005; Parkhe, 1993), and are of considerable
interest in the coopetition literature. Bengtsson and Kock (2014) con-
clude that coopetition is filled with tension, and this tension can be
viewed as either inherent in the relationship between cooperation and
competition (Wilhelm, 2011) or as a result of coopetition (Bengtsson,
Eriksson, & Wincent, 2010; Raza-Ullah et al., 2014). Hence, there are
several studies on the coopetition paradox, potential types of tensions
within this paradox, and how firms manage paradox/tension within an
alliance. There are numerous tensions that can emerge in cooperative
relationships, and the most common tensions in coopetition are related
to roles, knowledge, power and dependence as well as opportunism
(Tidström, 2014). Much effort has been devoted to resolving or un-
derstanding paradoxes (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989), which is evident
within the coopetition literature with several articles on different types
of management (Fernandez, Le Roy, & Gnyawali, 2014; Tidström,
2014), and relational issues related to tension and the resolving of
tension (Raza-Ullah et al., 2014). However, managing a paradox, such
as cooperation and competition, may not imply resolving or eliminating
the paradox, but rather tapping into its energizing potential
(Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). Lewis (2000) suggests that paradox
management means exploring, rather than suppressing, tensions. This
paper will explore the possible tensions related to power and depen-
dence, and how they are related to the coopetition paradox over time.
Cooperation on R&D within a coopetition alliance is a collective
process that should generate common benefits that are shared by all
partners within the alliance. When these common benefits are created,
power and dependence mechanisms may determine the distribution of
knowledge among the different partners. Cassiman et al. (2009) found
in their study of coopetitive R&D-projects that cooperation prevailed in
knowledge creation activities, whereas the competitive forces emerged
in the distribution of this knowledge. Ritala and Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen (2009) propose that knowledge-creation has a higher po-
tential in coopetition compared to cooperation between non-
S. Jakobsen Industrial Marketing Management 84 (2020) 251–260
252
competitors because firms share a large common knowledge base
concerning both markets and technologies. However, this potential is
more likely to be eroded because of opportunism concerns compared to
cooperation between non-competitors. The literature also points to the
duration of a relationship as a possible risk, as the longer the re-
lationship, the higher the possibility that a competitor can use the re-
sources and capabilities accessed during the relationship to reinforce its
own market advantage (Pellegrin-Boucher, Le Roy, & Gurău, 2013).
Competitive partners with a high absorptive capacity may act oppor-
tunistically and recognize and appropriate key technologies and know-
how from their partners (Quintana-García & Benavides-Velasco, 2004).
Hence, the possible tensions related to power and dependence re-
lationships in joint R&D, are interesting dimensions to study in order to
understand the coopetition paradox better.
2.2. Mutual dependence and asymmetry
This paper will take on a new approach to the discussion of paradox
and tension in coopetition and build on Das and Kumar's (2009) ar-
gument that the tension-based view on alliances cloud the considera-
tion that firms' quest for harmony is a significant factor in alliance
dynamics. They argue that through joint commitment and forbearance,
harmony is a natural outcome of an alliance, even as tension persist as
inevitable challenges. However, it may be too simple to say that trust,
commitment and strong cooperation will lead to weak tensions in
coopetition (Tidström, 2014), and there is a need for more research on
this process in particular and the coopetition process in general
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2014). The resource dependence theory is suitable
to study the development of coopetitive relationships, as the resource
dependence theory postulates that the need for resources creates in-
terdependencies between partners, and that these interdependencies
explain why organizations engage in different kinds of interorganiza-
tional arrangements such as board interlocks, alliances, joint ventures,
in-sourcing, and mergers and acquisition (Drees & Heugens, 2013;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The original theory of resource dependence
viewed interdependence between organizations as a combination be-
tween power imbalance and mutual dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik,
2003). This view has later been criticized as it is argued that these di-
mensions should be studied separately as they can influence resource
dependence in opposite ways. While mutual dependence helps us to
understand why firms seek long-term relationships (Casciaro &
Piskorski, 2005), power theories are useful in predicting the dynamics
of cooperative relationships over time (Smith et al., 1995). These two
dimensions will be discussed more in detail, as they can be suitable to
describe how firms handle tension in coopetition.
Mutual dependence between firms are important in alliances be-
cause an alliance where the mutual dependence erodes or vanishes, is
likely to terminate (Parkhe, 1993). Das and Kumar (2009) differentiate
between structural and psychological dependence when explaining
dependence between partners. This distinction is useful when dis-
cussing different aspects of mutual dependence and the relation be-
tween them. Structural dependence is in Das and Kumar's (2009, p. 35)
definition a dependence where “both partners are dependent on the alli-
ance specific investments that they have made”.When firms are confronted
with similar resource constraints, which may often be the case with
competing firms that operate in the same markets, this common re-
source dependency motivate firms to cooperate on accessing crucial
resources (Peng, Pike, Yang, & Roos, 2012). This will very often require
a financial investments towards the alliance, which can be both a
substantial and irreversible commitment (Drees & Heugens, 2013). Luo
(2008) suggests that economic integration within an alliance can in-
crease the value of other variables such as joint governance, interparty
trust and alliance performance. Further, Gulati and Sytch (2007) find
that joint dependence is important for firm's performance and that this
is mediated through joint action and the quality of information ex-
change. They view joint action as “the degree of dyadic cooperation and
coordination across a wide array of organizational activities, such as design,
cost control, and quality improvement”. Related to coopetition the joint
action can be most successful, or at least experience less tension, if it
concerns activities far from the customer, such as R&D. This is to de-
crease the risk of transferring knowledge important for a firm's com-
petitive advantage (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000), which is especially risky
in collaborative relationships with competitors. Hence, joint R&D might
be “easier” to handle over time compared to e.g. joint marketing or
joint product development. Another aspect of strategic dependence
between firms is that it does not necessarily imply that the partners are
satisfied with the relationship. An alliance member may be highly de-
pendent on the value creation within an alliance, but may not be par-
ticularly satisfied with it (Das & Kumar, 2009).
In addition to the structural dependence related to specific actions
like finance, joint action and information exchange, there is also a
psychological aspect of a relationship involving mutual dependence.
Dyer and Singh (1998) argue that an alliance will not generate a
competitive advantage if it does not invest in relation-specific assets.
Investing in such assets is important because no matter how mutually
beneficial and logical the structural parts of the alliance may seem at its
start, without trust and commitment, the alliance will fail entirely or at
least it will fail to reach its strategic potential (Cullen, Johnson, &
Sakano, 2000). Building a psychological dependence implies that the
partners are reluctant to dissolve the relationship (Das & Kumar, 2009),
as they experience a commitment towards their partners. Building and
sustaining mutual commitment through partner dependencies is im-
portant as it enables all partners in a relationship to engage in value-
creating activities (Holm, Eriksson, & Johanson, 1999). Important for
building a psychological dependence is the notion of trust between
partners. Trust is “a type of expectation that alleviates the fear that one's
exchange partner will act opportunistically” (Bradach & Eccles, 1989). As
risk of opportunism is considerable in competitive alliances and/or
where partners are highly interdependent, Krishnan, Martin, and
Noorderhaven (2006) shows that trust is important for reducing the
effects of uncertainties related to opportunistic behavior from partners.
Trust facilitates openness in knowledge sharing by allowing partners to
give each other the benefit of the doubt rather than interpret each
other's actions in a negative way (Krishnan et al., 2006). Another aspect
related to the relationship between partners that has not gained much
attention in neither the strategic alliance literature nor the coopetition
literature is the role of generosity in building trustful relationships.
Drawing on the psychology literature, Klapwijk and Van Lange (2009)
study of the psychological consequences of various interpersonal stra-
tegies in social dilemmas related to the conflict between self-interest
and collective interests found that in a noisy environment (i.e. when the
other party every now and then behaves less cooperatively), a generous
strategy caused an increase in cooperation. They conclude that when
noise is present, a generous strategy is perceived more moral and
trustworthy. If this is transferred to an alliance context, one can assume
that acts of generosity in an alliance where tension (noise) is present
will increase cooperation and trust, which again can strengthen the
psychological dependence. In an alliance without this psychological
dependence based on trust and generosity, the communication and
knowledge sharing will be restricted and the partners must rely on
impersonal and standardized mechanisms to communicate and share
knowledge (Enberg, 2012).
The structural and psychological aspects will be interrelated in the
process of creating mutual dependence, as high levels of structural
dependence will also lead to higher levels of psychological dependence
(Das & Kumar, 2009). Hence, for partners to experience a high degree
of dependence in each other, they need to have both a structural and
psychological dependence towards their partners. As Cullen et al.
(2000) argue; in evolving or long-term alliances it is difficult to rely on
merely contracts and agreements, as new issues or situations will re-
quire rewriting of these contracts. In such long-term alliances, trust can
fill the gaps in the formal contracts and help to keep the relationship
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running. However, these processes will take far longer to develop than
much traditional economic theory acknowledge (Ring & Van de Ven,
1994), and hence, we can assume that the structural dependence will be
developed first, and the psychological dependence will follow.
The second aspect important within the resource dependence theory
is the notion of a power imbalance or asymmetries between partners.
From the resource dependence theory, asymmetry exist when the ex-
change is not equally important for both firms in the relationship
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). The existence of asymmetries in a re-
lationship can lead to the stronger part taking advantage of the weaker
part. For this to occur, the net resource balance between firms must be
asymmetrical, meaning that the most powerful firm should have ad-
vantages related to several resources compared to their weaker coun-
terpart, and not just one aspect that can be counterbalanced by superior
resources in the partner firm (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Although
asymmetries related to power mean that the most powerful partner can
take advantage of their weaker counterparts, Gulati and Sytch (2007)
argue that firms that exert power in order to get the biggest piece of the
value creation-pie, might destroy value rather than creating value. This
can be illustrated by the case study of technological collaborations by
Davis and Eisenhardt (2011), where managers in dominating organi-
zations believed that they could access complementary resources from
their partners without relinquishing control to them. This turned out to
be difficult as the non‑leading firms were less motivated to assist the
leading firms without having any decision control. They found that
marshalling complementary capabilities from both partners was best
achieved through alternating control, where both partners made uni-
lateral decisions through the various stages of the collaboration.
In relation to coopetition, Gnyawali, He, and Madhavan (2007) also
use a pie-metaphor to explain the different stages of coopetition, where
the cooperation is evident in baking the pie, whereas the competition
surfaces in bargaining over the biggest slice. However, to take the pie-
metaphor even further, when there are asymmetries between firms, you
may have a situation where the cooperation firms might not want the
same piece of the pie. An example is a study on asymmetrical coope-
tition alliances where small and medium-sized innovative firms co-
operate with large competitors. Here the small and medium-sized firms
reap benefits in terms of increased technological diversity, whereas the
larger and more diversified firms gain access to very specialized tech-
nologies from smaller and more flexible firms (Quintana-García &
Benavides-Velasco, 2004). Hence, they are not interested in the same
piece of the pie. Further, within an asymmetrical alliance, there can be
a common understanding that the firms who bring most resources into
the relationship, can also appropriate the highest proportion of the
benefits (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). The role of the smaller firms might,
however, be affected by more powerful firms who make the crucial
decisions in their own favor (Bouncken & Kraus, 2013). The less re-
sourceful firms might be stuck on the sidelines, whereas the more re-
sourceful firms might not wish to stay in an alliance with partners that
cannot contribute as much (Ahuja, 2000). However, from the harmony-
view of interpartner cooperation, the concept of forbearance suggest
that patience and tolerance, both in relation to other partners' behavior
and to the alliance outcome (Das & Kumar, 2009), can help overcoming
possible tensions related to differences between partner firms. For-
bearance between firms is developed over time, and one can therefore
assume that tensions related to asymmetries will be higher in re-
lationships without trust and patience, compared to relationships where
such attributes are developed.
In summary, there is an understanding in the literature that coo-
petition is a paradoxical relationship (Wilhelm & Sydow, 2018), which
is filled with tension (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014). Part of a coopetition
alliance's success is related to how firms manage this paradox and it's
tensions. However, there is little knowledge on the coopetition process
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2014), especially on the interplay between the
paradox of cooperation and competition over time, (Park, Srivastava, &
Gnyawali, 2014b), how a coopetition alliance persists in a maturing
industry (Mathias et al., 2018), and how firms manage tensions in
coopetition (Tidström, 2014). This paper will address these issues by
analyzing the evolution of a coopetition alliance through how partners
handle possible tensions in joint R&D. This is analyzed through the
evolution of firms' structural and psychological dependence, as well as
an analysis of the effects of asymmetries between firms. The following
methods-section describes how a longitudinal case study is suitable to
explore this.
3. Methodology
3.1. Design and sample
In this research, a longitudinal case-study design was used to ex-
amine how firms handle the possible tensions in R&D-coopetition. The
paper employs a single-case study of a coopetition alliance to enhance
the existing framework and to build the relevant theory (Yin, 2013).
Using a single-case study is appropriate in this study because my case is
both critical and longitudinal. It is critical because it has a strategic im-
portance in relation to the general problem in study (Flyvbjerg, 2006),
and its longitudinal nature makes me able to specify how certain con-
ditions presented in the theoretical framework can change over time
(Yin, 2013). Related to the research question, there were set some
specific criteria for case-selection. First, as the aim of the research was
to contribute to the coopetition literature, an important criteria was to
select an alliance that included competing firms. The alliance chosen
fits the criteria because it consists of firms within the same industry that
compete (to different degrees) within the same markets. Further, as
there is a lack of knowledge on the evolvement of coopetition re-
lationships over time (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014; Park et al., 2014b) and
the capabilities that are necessary to coopete successfully (Bouncken
et al., 2015), a selection criteria was that the alliance should have
survived over some time in terms of several subsequent joint R&D-
projects. The selected case have conducted joint R&D since 1989 and
the longevity of the alliance could be reckoned as a success. Most of the
earlier studies on coopetition is done on dyadic relationships between
two firms, whereas there is an increasing focus on coopetition as part of
a firm's alliance portfolio (Bengtsson & Johansson, 2012; Park et al.,
2014a). To provide new insights on multi-partner coopetition, a cri-
terion was that the alliance had to consist of more than two competing
firms. This alliance consists of firms from six industrial groups within
one particular industry in Norway, and our data collection was con-
ducted in firms from five of these industrial groups. All Norwegian firms
within this industry are represented in the alliance. To the best of my
knowledge, there has been very little research of alliances where sev-
eral competing firms cooperate simultaneously. Thus, a study of such an
alliance is likely to extend the literature on coopetition, which is the
goal of performing case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989). The alliance in
study cooperates with external R&D partners (mainly universities and
public research organizations), who are included in most of their pro-
jects. The aim of the alliance is to pursue environmental improvements,
conduct basic research and increase the technological qualifications of
the employees within the industry. The alliance is operated as a non-
profit organization, with research activities funded by research grants
from the Research Council of Norway (30–50%) and by participation
fees from member companies. The participant firms can choose to exit
the alliance with one year's notice.
3.2. Data collection
The level of analysis in this study is the firms engaged in the coo-
petition alliance. The data collection includes interviews of 28 in-
formants from the alliance: 21 representing the firms, with an average
of four interviews at each firm, and seven representing the R&D part-
ners. The interviews were conducted in two time periods: the first 18
interviews were collected during autumn 2011, with 10 additional
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interviews collected in January 2014. All interviewees were partici-
pants in one or several of the four research projects being conducted by
the coopetition alliance. The data collection used a semi-structured
interview guide, where the questions were divided into themes related
to i.e., the partners' motivation, expectations and involvement in the
alliances, the interaction between the alliance partners and the research
and innovation activities. The interview guide was meant to serve as a
checklist to ensure that all relevant topics are covered, but the aim of
the interviews were to establish a conversational style where the in-
terviewees talked as freely as possible around the topics (Patton, 2015).
Two collaborating researchers conducted the entire data collection,
both in 2011 and 2014. Having multiple investigators in case studies is
advantageous because it increases the creative potential of the study
and enhances the confidence in the findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). Al-
though this article is written by one author, it draws on the benefits of
receiving comments from a college that knows the data as good as the
author. The interviews were recorded and transcribed by the data
collectors as part of the data analysis process. I also included insights
from observational data and project descriptions as part of the data
collection. These data sources were collected prior to the interviews in
order to give input to the interview protocol. The data gave us increased
knowledge on the alliance and its projects and made us more able to
generate relevant questions that could be pursued further in the inter-
views (Patton, 2015). As an example, our observations of the interac-
tion between the different firm representatives during breaks, con-
ference-dinner and after-party, gave us a clue into how important trust
and the social relationships were within this alliance. Hence, this was
given more attention than we first anticipated in the interviews.
I used a retrospective interviewing approach to gain deeper insight
into the firms' underlying structures and to obtain accurate information
on the cooperation history and the evolution of mutual dependence
over time (Miller, Cardinal, & Glick, 1997). With this approach I tried to
get the informant to reconstruct past experiences (Fraenkel, Wallen, &
Hyun, 1993), as well as reflecting over present situations. Using a ret-
rospective approach has it's pitfalls as the informants will view the past
through the lens of the present (Silverman, 2013), however, people
seldom forget about significant events (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). The
informants were thus encouraged to describe their involvement in the
coopetition alliance from its beginning to the present with a minimum
of interruptions by the interviewers. I also used this type of inter-
viewing to gain an in-depth understanding of the events that had oc-
curred in the alliance and to keep the data collection process from being
influenced by personal factors or the relevant theory (Czarniawska,
1998). The follow-up interviews two years after the first round of in-
terviews were aimed at both uncovering any changes within the alli-
ance, as well as giving additional information of topics that were found
to be of interest in the analysis of the interviews from the first round. Of
the ten persons interviewed in the second round, six were interviewed
in the first round, with four new informants. Interviews ranged from 40
to 127min, with an average of 69min (total 32 h and 16min). To avoid
bias, I did not use theoretical concepts explicitly in the interview set-
ting. Table 1 shows the informants' roles and the number of interviews
with each person.
3.3. Data analysis
The data analysis was based on cross-case comparisons, and the aim
was to identify cross-case patterns within the alliance (Yin, 2013) re-
lated to the mutual dependence as well as asymmetries between firms
and how they can contribute to less tension in R&D coopetition. I read
and reread the interview transcripts as the data were collected (Yin,
2013) to become familiar with each case and develop the ability to
identify general patterns across cases (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the coding
of the data, I integrated theory-driven deductive codes (e.g. structural
dependence through joint action, common challenges and financial
dependence) with data-driven inductive codes (Langley, 1999), which I
apply on two levels. First, there were codes emerging during the data
collection (such as the notion of generosity that was not uncovered in
the initial theoretical review), that were relevant to explain how firms
cooperate. Further, I also included inductively sub-codes, which were
assigned after the initial coding to add relevant detail to the code (e.g.,
time horizon). After the initial coding procedure, where both deductive
and inductive codes were used, I grouped the data into a smaller
number of categories, pattern codes, which can identify an emergent
explanation (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). This pattern-
matching strategy is found to be one of the most desirable techniques
within case study analysis (Yin, 2013). Compared to the initial coding
procedure, the pattern codes can be compared to theory in order to
create more conceptual codes that can be used to build constructs and
further theories (Miles et al., 2014). To illustrate how the data from my
case could provide evidence on the development of cooperative re-
lationships, I relied on tables that summarized findings related to the
constructs explaining the development of the coopetition alliance over
time (Miles et al., 2014). Such tables are helpful in theory-building
research because they illustrate the fit between the data and the con-
structs, which is necessary for building strong theories (Eisenhardt,
1989). Table 2 shows different firms' structural dependence towards the
alliance and Table 3 highlights firms' perceptions of the psychological
dependence between alliance firms. Table 4 shows the level of sym-
metry and asymmetry between the firms in the study. To build reliable
propositions, I went back and forth between the theory and data in
order to create theoretical propositions that have a close fit with the
data (Eisenhardt, 1989).
3.4. Quality of research
The quality of the research is discussed according to four tests;
construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability
(Yin, 2013). I used three tactics to ensure that the research actually
reflects the aim of the research and represents the phenomena in study
Table 1
Sources of primary and secondary data (number of persons interviewed in parentheses).
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4 Firm 5 Research partners
Informants round 1 (2011) CEO1 (1) CEO (1) Production manager
(1)
CEO (1) Researcher (2) Research partner 1 (2)
CEO2 (1) Policy manager (1) Researcher 1 (1) Researcher (2) Research partner 2 (1)
Engineer (1) Researcher 2 (1) Research partner 3 (1)
Representative for industry federation
(1)
Informants round 2 (2014) CEO3 (1) CEO (1) CEO1 (1) Researcher (1) CEO (1) Research partner 1 (1)
Researcher (1) Researcher 1 (1) Researcher (1) Research partner 2 (1)
Total no. of interviews 5 3 5 4 4 7
Secondary sources Firm presentation Firm presentation Firm presentation Firm presentation Firm presentation R&D project presentation
Press articles Press articles Press articles Press articles Press articles
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(construct validity). First, I used multiple sources of evidence, where I
triangulated secondary data (observational data, written documents
(project reports) and information collected online (the alliance web
page, firm's web pages and press articles)) with the interview data. The
secondary data was used to confirm or disconfirm the data from the
interviews. Second, the longitudinal nature of my data increases the
construct validity as investing more time in the field increases my
knowledge on the context and increases the likelihood of focusing on
the most relevant data, ignoring the less relevant information
(Johannessen, Tufte, & Christoffersen, 2010; Merriam, 2014). Third, I
let a key informant read a draft of the paper to check if my inter-
pretation resembled his experiences. When this informant felt that I had
described the case in accordance with his experience, it reduced the risk
of focusing on “wrong” constructs.
Further, to increase the internal validity of my research I tried to look
for data that support alternative explanations (Patton, 2015), and when
I did not find data that contradicted the explanations, the confidence in
the original explanations increases. Second, by using the pattern
matching analytic technique, I compared my findings with a predicted
pattern uncovered in the literature review. When the empirical and
predicted patterns appear to be similar, this increases the internal va-
lidity of the study (Yin, 2013).
Third, in qualitative research the external validity concerns whether
the findings are transferable beyond the case in this study. To ensure
that my findings can be transferable to other similar contexts, I col-
lected longitudinal data until the findings felt saturated, meaning that
we heard the same things over again and no more new information
surfaced (Merriam, 2014). Further, I developed propositions that may
be applicable in other contexts. Hence, the transferability of my find-
ings are best tested through the propositions that are meant to propose
how my findings might exist beyond the context of this particular study.
Last, the reliability of the research is ensured by providing details about
how data was collected, how it was analyzed and how I reached my
conclusions.
4. Results and discussion
The purpose of this study is to develop an understanding of how
firms manage the possible tensions related to R&D coopetition by




Common challenges (Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009) Financial dependence (Drees & Heugens, 2013) Joint action (Gulati & Sytch, 2007)
We ask at an alliance meeting: “we have this problem, do any
of you have the same problem?” (Researcher, Firm 4)
We get a lot done for a small amount of money
(Researcher, Firm 4)
They cooperate on things all are interested in, such as
environmental standards. (Research partner 1)
We have the same products so even when the data collection is
at another plant, we get access to the results which are
relevant for our own problems (Engineer, Firm 1).
The R&D we conduct is through the alliance
(CEO, Firm 1)
They join together in communicating with politicians and
environmental governments in order to set the right levels of
emission for the industry (Research partner 1)
The projects emerge because we have a problem we must fix
(Researcher, firm 5)
If you are four, five, six firms, then the costs are
shared by all. Then we are able to do much more
R&D for the same amount of money. (CEO, Firm
5)
The environmental governments wanted new data from the
firms. This would have meant a lot of work for all firms, but
we discussed this within the alliance and addressed the
government and argued that they would get an even better
result if they looked at the industry as a whole… so instead
of all of us inventing the wheel by ourselves, we did it
together. (Engineer, Firm 1)
We have an extra challenge compared to other countries. We
need to be competitive related to production and costs,
but on top of that we have more environmental demands
(Researcher, Firm 5)
The background for forming the alliance was to pool resources
across several firms in order to work on development that
would benefit all (CEO, Firm 5)
There has to be a will to acknowledge that there is a
common effort in conducting the kind of research that we do
(CEO, Firm 5)
It is easy to pick up the phone or send an e-mail and agree
that we will get organized and get to it!
Table 3
Perceptions of psychological dependence.
Psychological dependence
Trust Generosity
I experience a high degree of trust (Researcher, Firm 4) During measurements [data collection in the projects] at the specific production
plants, everyone knows that the firm where the data collection was conducted reaps
greater benefits than the other firms do. It is like an unwritten law (Researcher, Firm
4)
We have visited each other [about competitors] to look at how we deal with
environmental issues, but we do not enter each other's control room and look at other
process equipment (Engineer, Firm 1).
You do not experience the competition that much related to knowledge; no one is
afraid that some but not all will access the knowledge. (Research partner 1)
On processes, we do not share anything. That is quite important, because if it leaks
[process knowledge] people get skeptical and then the other aspects of cooperation
get destroyed (Engineer, Firm 1).
All the Norwegian firms desire that all the other firms shall remain in the country.
They do not want them to be moved, even if they are owned by their competitors
(Research partner 2)
Since the cooperation areas are clearly defined and based on the notion that everyone
bring something to the table, I believe that we have created a trust to facilitate such a
cooperative arena (Researcher, Firm 4).
In our world we experience that we reap benefits of drawing others' expertise where
we lack knowledge. Then we have to be generous enough to share our expertise when
they need it (Production manager, Firm 3)
What issues you can and cannot discuss is a big and important part of the research
projects (Research partner 2)
The people on the board are very pragmatic people who acknowledge other's needs.
In that way we have avoided conflicts around which areas to do research (CEO, Firm
2)
We understand each other, what we can say and bring into the cooperation (CEO, Firm 2) Even if not all results are relevant for our firm, we still get a lot for our investments
(CEO, Firm 5)
Over time the resources used are balanced across the different process areas [research
areas] (CEO, Firm 2)




Mutual dependence between firms is important for the longevity of
an alliance (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005), and understanding the mutual
dependence may therefore be a key to explain how firm handle tensions
in coopetition and are able to continue to cooperate over time. The
coopetition alliance in this study has survived for two decades and the
findings from the case study give insight into the development of mu-
tual dependence between firms. To illustrate the evolution over time,
the mutual dependence is analyzed in relation to the structural and
psychological dependence (Das & Kumar, 2009). First, the structural
dependence is analyzed through firms' common challenges (Ritala &
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009), financial dependence (Drees &
Heugens, 2013) and their joint action (Gulati & Sytch, 2007) (see
Table 2). The findings from the case firms show that the motivation
behind the formation of the alliance was that the industry had some
challenges they would rather address together than as separate firms.
These challenges are mainly related to increasing industry knowledge
through basic research as well as conducting joint R&D to address the
increasing amount of environmental regulations the industry faces.
These common challenges enhances the value-creation potential of the
coopetition alliance because the firms share a common industry
knowledge concerning both markets and technologies (Ritala &
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). The firms acknowledge that by co-
operating they can achieve much more than if one firm should do it
alone. This view is illustrated by quoting a representative from Firm 4
who says that “when everyone pools their finances together and the Re-
search Council contributes with additional resources, you get the possibility
to gain much more compared to your input. If you should do this alone it
would cost you much, much more”. A representative from one of the
smaller firms support this: “if we should spend 100.000 NOK to do just
about nothing [about research], it gets so much better, thorough and much
more when we cooperate” (Engineer, Firm 1). These quotes show that
there is a financial dependence between the alliance firms, and that this
financial dependence is motivated by the need to address common
challenges related to R&D. These findings are in line with previous
research on mutual dependence and point to the structural dependence
between firms (Das & Kumar, 2009; Peng et al., 2012). Table 2 shows
the structural dependence between firms:
When analyzing the evolution of the coopetition alliance over time,
it is observed that the structural dependence was crucial for the for-
mation of the alliance, and for the early evolution of the alliance. In the
early phase of the alliance, there was little knowledge exchange be-
tween the firms and the suspicion was rather high. The alliance's R&D
was conducted by the research partners and the firms paid their par-
ticipation fees and got access to the results from the research partners.
Using a third party, such as researchers, is common in alliances in order
to get access to complementary resources (Gebrekidan & Awuah, 2002).
However, in this case, the third party acted as a moderator between the
competing firms in the early stages of the alliance. One of the research
partners who has been involved in the alliance since the beginning
describes the situation in the early phase of the alliance: “Previously
there has been a strong confidentiality focus where they were not interested
in discussing with each other. Probably because they were afraid of leaking
firm specific knowledge”. This suspicion was most visible in the larger
firms as they had most to lose compared to their weaker partners. They
were more than willing to contribute financially to the alliance, but
kept their mouths shut when it came to their own knowledge. At this
stage the tension and suspicion between the firms was rather high and
the knowledge sharing low, as the knowledge sharing went through the
research partners. In such an early phase of an alliance between com-
peting firms, the firms are uncertain about the other firms' intentions
and they will therefore rely on impersonal and standardized mechan-
isms to communicate and share knowledge (Enberg, 2012). To secure
that none of the firms had more influence on what topics the alliances'
money were spent, they relied on the research partners to act as a
neutral third party who coordinated the alliance. Hence, this coopeti-
tion alliance was formed because the firms faced common industry
challenges that the single firms were unable to take on alone. This early
phase was characterized by tension related to uncertainty and suspicion
towards their partners, and the communication and knowledge sharing
between the firms were low. Based on this I propose:
Proposition 1. In the early phases of a coopetition alliance firms
handle tension by relying on a structural dependence with their
partners.
However, as the alliance evolved the level of interaction and com-
munication between the firms increased, illustrated by a quote from a
researcher in Firm 4: “You often get ideas when you learn about how others
have solved things… it is not a problem for me to call [name on researcher in
partner firm] and ask if I can come and see how they have solved things”.
The firms still rely heavily on the structural dependence in relation to
the alliance's joint R&D, but there has also emerged a psychological
dependence between the firms. According to Das and Kumar (2009) a
psychological dependence is present between firms in alliances when
they are reluctant to resolve the relationship because they experience a
commitment towards their partners. In line with Das and Kumar (2009)
this study use informants' perceptions of dependence to determine
psychological dependence, rather than “objective” measures of this
aspect of mutual dependence. The perceptions important for psycho-
logical dependence used in this study are trust (Krishnan et al., 2006)
and generosity (Klapwijk & Van Lange, 2009) as illustrated in Table 3.
Where the knowledge sharing was next to nothing in the early
phases of the alliance, as the alliance evolved there has been established
a common understanding of what to share and what not to share.
Although trust between partners is important for a well-running alli-
ance (Cullen et al., 2000; J. Yang, Wang, Wong, & Lai, 2008), I argue
that trust alone is not enough to explain the psychological dependence
between firms. Trust in the alliance is characterized by the absence of
opportunism or violation of their written agreements, as illustrated by a
quote from one of the firm representatives: “we trust that no one sneaks
around [when visiting partner firms] and looks at things they are not
Table 4
Case firm characteristics.
Firm Size Maturity Knowledge Level of coopetition
Employeesa Production plants Age Internal R&D involved in the alliance PhD-candidatesb Market symmetry
Firm 1 80–100 1 2003 Little 0 Same market as firm 5
Firm 2 100–150 1 1983 Little 0 Market overlap with firm 3 and 4
Firm 3 100–150 1 1989 Small R&D-department 1 Market overlap with firm 2 and 4
Firm 4 700–800 3 1969 R&D-department 12 Market overlap with firm 2 and 3
Firm 5 500–600 3 2001 R&D-department 3 Same market as firm 1
a Ranges are used to maintain anonymity
b Accumulated since the start in 1989.
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supposed to look at, and vice versa”. However, as coopetition is a para-
doxical relationship where tension is an inherent aspect, building a
psychological dependence between firms can be more challenging
compared to relationships with less tension. I therefore add the notion
of generosity to explain the level of psychological dependence between
firms. Acts of generosity are when you act in a way that will benefit
others, rather than pursuing self-interest (Klapwijk & Van Lange, 2009).
The CEO from Firm 2 describes the generosity within the alliance with
these words:
“You must be willing to give, and not just try to satisfy your own needs. It
is often the case in research that even if the areas of research lies within
your cooperation partner's areas, there will still emerge some basic
knowledge that you can utilize yourself. So you ought to be a bit gen-
erous. That is important; very important to try to acknowledge other's
needs as well.”
The firms experience that if they are generous towards their partner
in one area, they will receive the same generosity the next time around.
Overall, there has evolved a notion within the alliance that you have to
wait your turn. If the current research project is not of interest for your
firm, the generous nature of the alliance implies that the next one will.
Hence, as the firms perceive their coopetition partners as both trust-
worthy and generous, the alliance avoids tensions and opportunistic
behavior. Because there were less interaction and more tension in the
early phases of the alliance, I propose that the psychological depen-
dence between firms is built over time and reduce tension through trust
and generosity.
Proposition 2. Building a psychological dependence over time,
through trust and generosity, reduces tension in a coopetition alliance.
4.2. Asymmetries
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) for asymmetry to occur,
the net resource balance between firms must be asymmetrical, meaning
that the most powerful firm should have advantages related to several
resources compared to their weaker counterpart, and not just one as-
pect that can be counterbalanced by superior resources in the partner
firm. As the alliance in study is a multi-partner alliance, the level of
symmetry between the firms will vary as illustrated in Table 4.
Firms 4 and 5, stand out with superior resources related to size and
knowledge, compared to the three other firms in the sample. Table 4
also indicate some areas of symmetry, as all firms can be considered to
be well-established in a mature industry. Related to coopetition there
are market symmetries between the firms. Firms 1 and 5 experience a
large market overlap and are direct competitors in the market, whereas
the three other firms have less market overlap and the level of com-
petition is lower. Overall, Firms 4 and 5 stand out as more powerful
compared to the Firms 1–3, related to both size and knowledge. Ac-
cording to the literature on resource dependence, the most powerful
firms can take advantage of their weaker counterparts in an asymmetric
relationship (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), although others argue that this
can destroy rather than create value (Gulati & Sytch, 2007). Evidence
from the case firms show that the most powerful firms exert some level
of power over the smaller firms as the large firms are more active in
setting the agenda for which areas the alliance should do research.
However, since the alliance firms are within the same industry they
experience similar challenges and the smaller firms are confident that
the larger firms set an agenda that will also be relevant for them. Hence,
since they experience both a structural and psychological dependence
towards one another, the possible tensions related to asymmetries are
reduced. This is illustrated by one of the research partners who observe
that “when the largest firms get involved, the smaller firms will also gain
substantial benefits”. This is supported by the production manager from
Firm 3, who states: “we are too ‘light-weighted’ to generate enough research
ideas… so having such a network is extremely positive for us”.
Proposition 3. When a structural and/or psychological dependence is
present within a coopetition alliance, the possible tensions related to
asymmetries between firms are reduced.
5. Conclusion and implications
This study is a novel attempt to address the call for more studies on
the evolution of coopetition alliances over time (Bengtsson & Kock,
2014). Through a longitudinal case study of firms in a Norwegian
coopetition alliance, this paper makes three distinct contributions to the
coopetition literature, which are illustrated in Fig. 1.
First, I extend the literature on how firms handle the possible ten-
sions arising from cooperating with competitors (Tidström, 2014) by
showing that in the early phases of a coopetition alliance, firms handle
tension by relying on a structural dependence with their partners (P1 in
the Fig. 1). This structural dependence is motivated by common in-
dustry challenges that create resource dependencies, which motivate
competing firms to pool some of their resources and address these
challenges together. This phase is characterized by suspicion and arms-
length interaction where the value creation is mainly through their
external resource partners. Second, my findings contribute with evi-
dence on what capabilities that are necessary to coopete successfully
(Bouncken et al., 2015) with insight into how repeated cooperation
adds a psychological dependence between the coopetition partners (P2
in Fig. 1). Building trust and generosity within the alliance reduces
Fig. 1. Graphical illustration of how firms handle possible tensions related to power and dependence in a coopetition alliance over time.
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tension and facilitates success through more interaction between the
coopetition firms. Third, my findings provide insight how coopetition
persists beyond a market category's emergent phase (Mathias et al.,
2018), by showing that strong dependencies can reduce other tensions,
such as tensions related to asymmetries (P3 in Fig. 1).
5.1. Limitations and direction for future research
This study has its limitations that can provide potential avenues for
further research on coopetition alliances. One of the limitations of the
current study is its focus on a single industry in Norway and the lack of
comparison with other coopetition alliances in other countries. Future
studies could transfer the propositions developed in this paper into
other coopetition alliances to see if they are valid in a cross-industry
and/or cross-national context or if they are specific for the industry in
study. Another limitation is related to the qualitative nature of this
research. As the study addresses gaps in the coopetition literature re-
garding the evolution of coopetition alliances and how firms handle
tension in coopetition, it is argued that in-depth, longitudinal, quali-
tative studies are best able to understand these complex processes.
Although the findings might be transferable to other coopetition alli-
ances, one cannot argue that they are universally valid. However, fu-
ture research could test the propositions statistically to explore whether
the results are transferable to other coopetition alliances. This study is
one of few studies on multi-partner coopetition and lack comparison
with other empirical examples. Future studies should therefore consider
multi-partner coopetition alliances, especially in terms of how they
develop over time and handle the possible tensions between several
partners.
5.2. Implications
The findings from this study indicate that firms of different sizes and
level of resources can join together in joint R&D without much tension.
These findings have implications for the coopetition literature, policy
makers, firms and managers. First, to the coopetition literature, the
results of this study inquire into the question about how coopetition
persists in a mature industry over time (Mathias et al., 2018; Park et al.,
2014b), with the added insight that the development of dependencies
reduces tension in the paradoxical cooperation between competitors.
Second, the findings also have some implications for policy. Coopetition
alliances can be difficult to establish due to antitrust laws, but as this
paper shows that such alliances can contribute to value creation in the
form of new industry knowledge and innovation, policy makers inter-
ested in industrial development should facilitate and encourage such
alliances. Further, as the coopetition paradox is considered to be filled
with tension, firms need to build trustful relationships over time.
Hence, policy makers can support long-term R&D projects where coo-
peting firms are given time to build trustful relationships.
Further, the results from the analysis also have some important
implications for firms and managers. As firms are increasingly involved
in alliances with external partners in order to gain new knowledge, they
should also consider their competitors as potential partners because
they share a large common knowledge base. However, to reduce the
possible tension in this relationship, firms should have a long-term
commitment towards the alliance as the psychological dependence
based on trust and generosity between firms is built over time. Being
patient, generous and trustworthy with your collaborating competitor is
important as they will act similar towards you and together you can
achieve an increased value creation. However, as building trust and
generosity takes time, firms should not be naïve and can rely on con-
tracts regulating the cooperation, especially in new partnerships. Firms
should also acknowledge that when collaborating with competitors, the
ideal partner might be a firm with somewhat different characteristics
from yourself, as this might reduce possible tensions in cooperation.
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